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Abstract. Based on hypothetical responses originating from a large-scale survey among
about 7,000 German households, this study investigates the discrepancy in willingness-
to pay (WTP) estimates for green electricity across discrete-choice and open-ended val-
uation formats, thereby accounting for perceived consequentiality: respondents self-
select into two groups distinguished by their belief in the consequentiality of their
answers for policy making. Recognizing that consequentiality status and WTP might
be jointly influenced by unobservable factors, we employ a switching regression model
that accounts for the potential endogeneity of respondents’ belief in consequences and,
hence, biases from sample selectivity. Contrasting with the received literature, we find
WTP bids that tend to be higher among those respondents who obtained questions
in the open-ended format, rather than single binary choice questions. This difference
shrinks, however, when focusing on individuals who perceive the survey as politically
consequential.
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1 Introduction
Non-market goods, such as reductions in air pollution, are typically valued on the
basis of willingness-to-pay (WTP) bids. Being indispensable for gauging the welfare
implications of alternative policy options, WTP estimates, ideally, rely on revealed,
rather than stated preferences (Harrison, 2006, p. 125). Frequently, however, revealed-
preference information is unavailable, with one reason being the lack of markets (Blu-
menschein et al., 2008, p. 114). Another reason for the absence of such information
owes to market interventions that distort price signals.
A particular deficit with respect to revealed-preference information pertains to
electricity produced on the basis of renewable energy technologies (Andor et al., 2017),
called here green electricity. In Germany, this is due to the fact that contracts on the
delivery of green electricity are often cheaper than those for conventional electricity,
although the cost of renewable electricity production is generally higher. This circum-
stance owes to cheap imports of green electricity produced on the basis of competitive
water power and prevents researchers from receiving comprehensive information on
consumers’ true preferences. As nobody can be excluded from the associated benefits
for which there is no rivalry, green electricity is an example for a public good (see e. g.
Menges et al., 2005, p. 432).
In the absence of empirical evidence on revealed preferences, researchers widely
employ stated-preference (SP) methods to elicit the value of non-market goods on the
basis of hypothetical choices. One commonly employed SP approach is the contingent-
valuation method (CVM), which allows for eliciting passive-use values, that is, eco-
nomic benefits that are not directly experienced by respondents. Applying this ap-
proach appears to be particularly appropriate in the case of green electricity, as the
benefits from curbing greenhouse gas emissions may be largely determined by passive-
use values arising from bequests to future generations (Whitehead and Cherry, 2007,
p. 248).
Although SP methods are favored theoretically for their ability to measure total
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economic value, their external validity remains the subject of much debate (Vossler and
Watson, 2013). In fact, there is ample empirical evidence that SP studies may suffer
from hypothetical bias, as has been documented extensively in the literature (see e. g.
Bishop and Heberlein, 1979, as well as the reviews by Harrison, 2006, and Harrison
and Rutström, 2008). To remove or, at least, reduce this bias, various techniques have
been proposed, among which is the consequential-script corrective suggested by Bulte
et al. (2005, p. 334).1
In addition, economic theory suggests that for incentive compatibility, i. e. the in-
centive to truthfully reveal preferences, consequentiality is needed (Carson and Groves,
2007; Carson et al., 2014; Vossler et al., 2012; Vossler and Holladay, 2016). Vossler and
Watson (2013) are the first who compare SP responses with the outcome of a parallel
public referendum, demonstrating that the hypothetical bias in contingent valuation
can be eliminated by focusing on those respondents who perceive their answer as con-
sequential for policy making.
Accounting for perceived consequentiality and employing hypothetical responses
originating from a large-scale survey among more than 7,000 German households, this
study investigates the discrepancy in WTP bids for green electricity across discrete-
choice and open-ended valuation formats, the two most common methods to elicit
WTP values. To this end, an ex-post procedure is applied that endogenously divides
respondents into two groups distinguished by their belief in the consequentiality of
their answers for policy making. Recognizing that consequentiality status and WTP
might be jointly influenced by unobservable factors, we employ a switching regres-
sion model that accounts for the potential endogeneity of respondents’ belief in conse-
quences and, hence, biases from sample selectivity. Using an experimental design, our
additional aim is to gauge the extent to which WTP estimates vary according to the
ex-ante treatment in the form of a consequential script, which is crossed with the two
WTP elicitation formats.
1Alternative techniques are the cheap-talk protocol introduced by Cummings and Taylor (1999) and
the certainty approach conceived by Johannesson et al. (1998).
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Among our major empirical results is the finding of a WTP for green electric-
ity that tends to be higher among those respondents who received the open-ended
question. This outcome contrasts with the literature (see Brown et al., 1996, for an
overview): While there are significant differences in WTP bids across discrete-choice
and open-ended contingent valuation studies (Kealy and Turner, 1993; Halvorsen and
Sœlensminde, 1998), the majority of empirical analyses find WTP estimates that are
higher for the discrete-choice than for the open-ended format. The difference in our
WTP bids across the open-ended and discrete-choice format shrinks, however, when
we focus on individuals who perceive the survey as politically consequential.
The following section provides a summary of the data and the survey design.
Section 3 presents some descriptive results. Section 4 explains the methods applied,
followed by the presentation of our empirical results in Section 5. The last section
summarizes and concludes.
2 Data and Experimental Design
To elicit households’ WTP for green electricity, we have employed both discrete-choice
and open-ended questions, the two most widely used valuation formats in applied
contingent valuation studies – see Ami et al. (2011), Andor et al. (2017) and Carlsson
et al. (2011) for recent studies employing open-ended methods and Jobstvogt et al.
(2014), Veronesi et al. (2014), as well as Whitehead and Cherry (2007) for analyses
based on the discrete-choice format. In a discrete-choice setting, respondents are asked
whether they would accept a given price for the good under scrutiny, whereas in the
open-ended format respondents are asked what their maximum WTP for this good
would be.
One advantage of the open-ended format over the discrete-choice method is that
it provides information on the whole range of a respondents’ WTP, whereas the discrete-
choice method only yields information about whether an individual’s WTP is below
or above a certain threshold (Halvorsen and Sœlensminde, 1998). Therefore, discrete-
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choice methods may perform very poorly if respondents’ maximum WTP is much
higher than the maximum amount included in the discrete-choice experiment (van der
Pol et al., 2008). The relative advantage of the discrete-choice valuation method is that
it alleviates incentives for survey respondents to strategically over- or understate their
WTP (Arrow et al., 1993).
The survey was conducted in 2015 in collaboration with the survey institute forsa,
which maintains a panel of more than 10,000 households that is representative for the
German speaking population.2 forsa collects data using a state-of-the-art tool that al-
lows panelists to fill out the questionnaire using either a television or the internet. Re-
spondents – in our survey the household heads – retrieve and return questionnaires
from home and can interrupt and continue the survey at any time. A large set of
socio-economic and demographic background information on all household members
is available from forsa’s household selection procedure and updated regularly. Within
the survey period of March 3 to April 29, 2015, 7,077 household heads completed the
questionnaire.
Panelists are randomly divided into two groups of equal size, one of which is
confronted with a consequential script, reported below.3 Both groups are randomly
divided into two equally large subgroups, whose members obtain a question on their
WTP for green electricity in either the open-ended or the discrete-choice format. This
yields a split-sample survey design as presented in Table 1, where the number and
shares of individuals in each of the treatment groups is reported.
Both the discrete-choice question and the open-ended question are preceded by
a brief introductory text that indicates the share of renewable energy in electricity pro-
duction at the time of the survey, 28%, as well as the government’s target of 35% by
2020. The text further notes the 6.17 cent surcharge for the support of renewable en-
ergies in 2015, the so-called EEG Levy, and includes the implications of this surcharge
2Information on the panel is available at http://www.forsa.com/.
3While there may be biases from ordering effects (see e. g. Carlsson et al., 2012), randomizing the
draws of the alternatives should minimize such biases (Bateman and Langford, 1997; Clark and Friesen,
2008).
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Table 1: Experimental Design: Shares and Number of Observations in Treatment
Groups
Consequential Script
No Yes Total Shares
Discrete-Choice

1 Cent 552 534 1,086 33.8%
2 Cents 525 537 1,062 33.1%
4 Cents 528 536 1,064 33.1%
Total 1,605 1,607 3,212 52.7%
Open-Ended 1,401 1,479 2,880 47.3%
Total 3,006 3,086 6,092 100.0%
Shares 49.3% 50.7% 100.0% –
for the overall cost increase faced by a typical household over a year.
Respondents who are posed the open-ended question are then presented with the
following text: “In order to reach the target of 35% renewable energy in the electricity
mix in Germany, what is the maximum increase in the surcharge (in cents per kilowatt
hour) that you would be willing to pay?” While this open-ended question principally
allows for unlimited WTP bids, the discrete-choice question gauges the willingness
to incur either of three pre-determined increases in the surcharge for the promotion of
renewable energy technologies. In detail, the translation of the discrete-choice question
reads: “Would you be willing to pay an additional X cents on the per kilowatt hour
surcharge in order to reach the target of 35% renewable energy in the electricity mix by
2020?”, where X is randomly replaced with either a 1, 2, or 4. Given the nearly 4-cents
increase in the surcharge between 2010 and 2015, and anticipated further increases
owing to the continued expansion of renewable capacity, the provided range seems a
reasonable approximation of the cost increases that households are likely to face in the
upcoming years.
As a result of our randomization procedure, for the discrete-choice format, we
end up with three sub-groups that are of almost equal size (Table 1), thereby reflect-
ing the original randomization. (Table A1 of the Appendix reports the means for the
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Table 2: Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics
Means
Open- Discrete
Variable Name Variable Definition Ended Choice
Age Age of respondent 55.2 55.4
Female Dummy: 1 if respondent is female 0.352 0.329
Children Dummy: 1 if respondent has children 0.704 0.703
College Degree Dummy: 1 if household head has a college degree 0.321 0.312
Script Dummy: 1 if household received a consequential script 0.500 0.500
Consequentiality Dummy: 1 if respondent believes that surveys
influence political decision making 0.591 0.608
1 Cent Dummy: 1 if respondent was asked to
accept a 1 Cent increase in the EEG Levy 0.331 0.333
2 Cents Dummy: 1 if respondent was asked to
accept a 2 Cent increase in the EEG Levy 0.340 0.333
4 Cents Dummy: 1 if respondent was asked to
accept a 4 Cent increase in the EEG Levy 0.330 0.333
Low income Dummy: 1 if net monthly household income
is lower than e1,200 0.083 0.082
Medium income Dummy: 1 if net monthly household income
is between e1,200 and e2,700 0.412 0.433
High income Dummy: 1 if net monthly household income
is between e2,700 and e4,200 0.334 0.313
Very high income Dummy: 1 if net monthly household income
exceeds e4,200 0.169 0.172
1-Person household Dummy: 1 if # household members equals 1 0.269 0.275
2-Person household Dummy: 1 if # household members equals 2 0.489 0.472
3-Person household Dummy: 1 if # household members equals 3 0.132 0.130
> 3-Person household Dummy: 1 if # household members >3 0.109 0.123
More time Dummy: 1 if respondent needs more time than 0.510 0.494
the median duration to complete the survey
control variables across the three subgroups, indicating a successful randomization.)
With largely equal shares of 47.3% and 52.7%, a somewhat stronger deviation from
the originally random partition is observed for those sub-groups that either face the
discrete-choice or the open-ended questions, while half of all respondents received a
consequential script (50.7%).
Our consequential script is mainly inspired by Bulte et al. (2005) and condensed
as much as possible to avoid that panelists ignore the script simply because of the time
requirements for reading the text:
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“We would like to point out that this survey is part of a research project on
behalf of the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF).
The results of this survey will be made available to policy makers and serve
as a basis for future decisions, especially with respect to the future level
of the surcharge for the promotion of renewable energy technologies (EEG
Levy). To reach meaningful conclusions, it is therefore important that you
provide exactly the amount that you actually would be willing to pay at
most.”
Finally, as economic theory suggests that consequentiality is needed for incentive
compatibility (Carson and Groves, 2007; Vossler et al., 2012), we explore whether there
are significant discrepancies in the WTP bids for those respondents who believe that
their responses may have political consequences. To this end, upon stating their pref-
erences in the contingent valuation questions, in a follow-up question, respondents
were requested to provide their judgement with respect to the political consequences
of their responses:
“How likely do you believe that results of surveys, such as the present one,
influence policy decisions on the amount of the surcharge for the promotion
of renewable energy technologies (EEG Levy)?”
The answers to this question are measured on a 5-point Likert scale, where 1 stands for
“Very unlikely” and 5 indicates “Very likely”.
Following Vossler and Watson (2013), we assign those respondents who chose the
option "Very unlikely" to the inconsequential group, but all others to the consequen-
tial group, an assignment reflected by the dummy variable Consequentiality presented
in Table 2. This assignment is in accordance with economic theory, suggesting a dis-
tinction between people who believe that their responses might influence the action
of policy makers at least to some extent and those who do not see any link between
surveys and policy actions (Carson and Groves, 2007; Vossler et al., 2012).
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About 60% of the respondents selected themselves into the consequential group
(Table 2). The remaining 40% of the respondents selected themselves into the inconse-
quential group. This share is rather high compared to the literature, where the share of
the inconsequential group ranges from 4% in the study by Herriges et al. (2010) up to
30% in Hwang et al. (2014). This discrepancy, however, may be due to the fact that our
survey was conducted in Germany, while most other studies originate from the US.
3 Descriptive Statistics
To compare responses across formats, we follow Balistreri et al. (2001) and convert the
WTP bids originating from the open-ended questions into binary values by assuming
that respondents would have accepted a randomly given increase in the EEG Levy of
either 1, 2, or 4 cents if their WTP bid were to be at least as large as the respective levy
increase, thereby randomly allocating the open-ended bids to one of the three levy in-
creases. The resulting binary variable of acceptance serves as the dependent variable in
the estimations presented in the subsequent section. The randomized transformation
of the continuous WTP bids into 0/1 values is highly important for getting unbiased
estimates of the difference between the discrete-choice and open-ended valuation for-
mats (Balistreri et al., 2001),
The panel at the right-hand side of Table 3 reports the results of this exercise, that
is, the shares of those respondents who would accept a future increase in the surcharge
for the promotion of green electricity (EEG Levy) of either 1, 2, or 4 cents. Not surpris-
ingly, for both formats, a stronger increase in this levy comes with a decrease in the
acceptance rates.
From a casual inspection, apart from the strongest increase in the promotion cost
of green electricity of 4 cents per kWh, we see substantial differences in the acceptance
rates of further cost increases across both formats: Apparently, the mean acceptance
rates are much higher for respondents who are faced with open-ended questions. This
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Table 3: Acceptance Rates of a Rise in the Promotion Cost of Renewable Technolo-
gies across Elicitation Formats
Discrete-Choice Format Open-Ended Format
Number of Share of Yes Number of Share of Yes
Observations Responses Observations Responses t Statistics
1 Cent 1,086 53.6% 951 70.5% -7.93∗∗∗
2 Cents 1,062 46.3% 978 57.4% -5.01∗∗∗
4 Cents 1,064 33.7% 951 33.7% 0.03
Total 3,212 44.6% 2,880 53.9% -7.26∗∗∗
Note: ∗ denotes significance at the 5 %-level, ∗∗ at the 1 %-level, and ∗∗∗ at the 0.1 %-level, respectively.
impression can be confirmed using a t test:
t =
xDC − xOE
sp ∗
√
1
nDC
+ 1nOE
, (1)
where xDC and xOE denote the mean acceptance rates of the discrete-choice and open-
ended valuation groups, respectively, nDC and nOE the respective sample sizes, and
sp is the pooled standard deviation of the acceptance rates of the two subgroups. The
resulting t statistics, reported in the last column of Table 3, indicate that the difference
between both formats is statistically significantly different from 0 for levy increases of
1 and 2 cents, but not for an increase of 4 cents.
With respect to the impact of the consequential script, we find no statistically
significant differences between respondents who received the consequential script and
those who did not. This is indicated by the t statistics reported in Table 4, which are
calculated along the lines of Equation 1. In contrast to the consequential script, there
are dramatic discrepancies across the consequential and inconsequential groups (Table
5): For both the discrete-choice and the open-ended format, the acceptance rates are
significantly higher for respondents who believe that their responses might influence
the action of policy makers. This finding is supported by the open-ended bids: with 1
cent, the median bid for the inconsequential group is lower than the median of 3 cents
for the consequential group.
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Table 4: Acceptance Rates of the Promotion Cost of Renewable Technologies when
Elicitation Formats are Crossed with the Consequential Script
Discrete-Choice Format Open-Ended Format
Consequential
Script No Yes No Yes
# of Share of # of Share of t Statis- # of Share of # of Share of t Statis-
Obs. Yes Obs. Yes tics Obs. Yes Obs. Yes tics
1 Cent 552 53.8% 534 53.4% 0.14 465 70.1% 487 70.8% -0.25
2 Cents 525 47.1% 537 45.6% 0.46 479 57.6% 499 57.1% 0.16
4 Cents 528 34.1% 536 33.4% 0.24 457 31.3% 493 35.9% -1.50
Total 1,605 45.1% 1,607 44.1% 0.56 1,401 53.2% 1,479 54.6% -0.75
Note: ∗ denotes significance at the 5 %-level, ∗∗ at the 1 %-level, and ∗∗∗ at the 0.1 %-level, respectively.
Table 5: Acceptance Rates of the Promotion Cost of Renewable Technologies when
Elicitation Formats are Crossed with Consequentiality
Discrete-Choice Format Open-Ended Format
Consequentiality No Yes No Yes
# of Share of # of Share of t Statis- # of Share of # of Share of t Statis-
Obs. Yes Obs. Yes tics Obs. Yes Obs. Yes tics
1 Cent 406 32.0% 666 66.5% 11.65∗∗∗ 380 53.2% 561 81.8% 9.91∗∗∗
2 Cents 398 21.6% 651 61.4% 13.61∗∗∗ 380 42.9% 592 66.6% 7.48∗∗∗
4 Cents 446 13.0% 603 49.3% 13.24∗∗∗ 391 23.0% 552 41.1% 5.90∗∗∗
Total 1,250 21.9% 1,920 59.4% 22.29∗∗∗ 1,151 39.5% 1,705 63.3% 12.87∗∗∗
Note: ∗ denotes significance at the 5 %-level, ∗∗ at the 1 %-level, and ∗∗∗ at the 0.1 %-level, respectively.
4 Methodology
Pooling the observations from the discrete-choice and open-ended formats, we esti-
mate both a probit and a linear probability model that are based on the following spec-
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ification: 4
Yesi = β0 + β1Discrete-Choicei + β2 2 Centsi + β3 4 Centsi + β4 Scripti
+β5Consequentialityi + β6(Consequentialityi ∗ Discrete-Choicei) (2)
+δTxi + ei,
where Yesi is a dummy variable that equals unity if individual i accepts a given in-
crease in the EEG Levy and zero otherwise, 2 Cents and 4 Cents are dummy variables
that indicate whether this increase amounts to 2 or 4 cents, respectively, with 1 cent as
the base category. Discrete-Choicei is a dummy variable that tells us whether respondent
i received the corresponding question in the discrete-choice format. The dummy vari-
able (Script) indicates whether the respondent received a consequential script. Most
importantly, Equation 2 also includes the dummy variable Consequentiality, which re-
flects respondents’ belief that their responses may have political consequences. To in-
vestigate whether political consequentiality affects responses differently depending on
the elicitation format, an interaction term is added to Equation 2. The specification is
completed with a vector x of socio-economic characteristics, such as gender, age, and
education of the household head, household size and income, and whether there are
children in the household, while δ is the corresponding parameter vector and e desig-
nates an idiosyncratic error term.
To cope with the potential endogeneity of consequentiality, we apply an endoge-
nous switching regression model (see Maddala, 1983, pp. 223-228) that, in the first
stage, divides respondents into two regimes, those who believe that their responses
may have political consequences to at least some extent and those who do not:
Consequentialityi = 1 if γT · zi ≥ ui,
Consequentialityi = 0 otherwise,
(3)
where vector zi includes factors that may affect whether a household head i either be-
lieves that her answer influences the political decision making (Consequentialityi = 1)
4Angrist and Pischke (2009) recommend estimating linear probability models instead of nonlinear
models to avoid distributional assumptions. To check the robustness of our results, we also estimate
specification 2 using a probit model.
11
or the respondent believes this to be very unlikely (Consequentialityi = 0). The un-
known parameter vector γ that determines the consequentiality status can be esti-
mated – up to a scale factor – using standard probit maximum likelihood methods,
where, due to the indeterminacy of the scale factor, Var(ui) = 1 can be assumed.
Depending on consequentiality status, the second-stage equations of this endoge-
nous switching regression model are given by:
WTP1i = βT1 · x1i − σ1u · IVM1i + ε1i, if Consequentialityi = 1, (4)
WTP0i = βT0 · x0i + σ0u · IVM0i + ε0i, if Consequentialityi = 0, (5)
where ε1i and ε0i are residuals with zero conditional mean, WTP1i and WTP0i denote
the household heads’ individual WTP bids and x1i and x0i include their determinants,
such as net household income, while β1 and β0 are vectors of the associated parameters
to be estimated. The two variables
IVM1i :=
φ(γT · zi)
Φ(γT · zi) , IVM0i :=
φ(γT · zi)
1−Φ(γT · zi) (6)
represent variants of the inverse Mills ratios, with φ(.) and Φ(.) denoting the den-
sity and cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution, respectively.
When appended as extra regressors in the second-stage estimation, the inverse Mills
ratios are controls for potential biases arising from sample selectivity: It is likely that
unobservable factors, such as carelessness about electricity bills, also affect WTP bids.
If the estimates of the coefficients σ1u and σ0u are statistically significant, this is an in-
dication of sample selectivity.
For the second-stage estimation, we insert the predicted values ÎVM1i and ÎVM0i
using the probit estimates γ̂ of the first-stage estimation. Given that the variance of
the residuals is heteroscedastic in nature (see Maddala, 1983, p. 225), Equations 4 and
5 should be estimated by weighted least squares using the Huber-White estimates of
variance. In addition to employing this two-stage procedure, we estimate both stages
at once using full information maximum likelihood (FIML) methods and the Stata com-
mand movestay (Lokshin and Sajaia, 2004) to check the robustness of the results and
obtain consistent estimates of the standard errors.
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Identification of the switching regression model requires specifying at least one
variable that determines the discrete first-stage outcome on consequentiality, but does
not affect the WTP response described by the second-stage model (exclusion restric-
tion). To this end, we employ a dummy variable that equals unity if a respondent
needed more time to finish the survey than the median duration of 22.55 minutes and
zero otherwise (more time, see Table 2). Assuming that this variable is uncorrelated
with an individual’s WTP, it is not included in the second-stage regression.
5 Results
Estimating specification 2 using a linear probability model (LPM) reconfirms the de-
scriptive findings presented in Section 3: In contrast to the majority of empirical anal-
yses, our WTP bids resulting from the discrete-choice questions tend to be lower than
those originating from the open-ended format (Table 6). In fact, our results contrast
most with those of Seller et al. (1985), who elicit WTP estimates from the discrete-choice
format that are up to four times as large as those originating from the open-ended for-
mat. Other studies, such as Kealy and Turner (1993) and Halvorsen and Sœlensminde
(1998), find the discrete-choice estimates about twice as large as those of the open-
ended format. Compared to these studies, the difference of less than 20 percentage
points between our open-ended and discrete-choice estimates is rather moderate, but
significant in statistical and economic terms.
Furthermore, in line with theory, strong increases in the EEG Levy have a neg-
ative effect on the acceptance of this additional burden for German households, with
the effect being most pronounced in case of a 4-cents increase. Of the socio-economic
characteristics, higher age, being female and having a college education are associated
with higher WTP values, while having children moderates the WTP for green electric-
ity. Income and household size do not have any effect on WTP, nor does the reception
of a consequential script.
The marginal effects resulting from the corresponding probit model estimation,
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presented at the right-hand panel of Table 6, mimic the coefficient estimates of the LPM
in terms of signs, magnitudes, and significance levels. Most notably, we again find a
positive relationship between WTP and political consequentiality, which is associated
with a higher WTP of approximately 20 percentage points. This outcome is in line with
the studies by Herriges et al. (2010), Hwang et al. (2014), Vossler and Watson (2013)
and Vossler and Holladay (2016), who also find a higher WTP for the consequential
group. Another result also bears noting: the positive coefficient on the interaction term
Consequentiality * Discrete-Choice indicates that the difference between open-ended and
discrete-choice contingent valuation is reduced, to less than 6 percentage points when
focusing on those individuals who perceive their answer as politically consequential.
Table 6: Estimation Results for the Acceptance of Future Rises in the Promotion Cost
of Green Electricity
Linear Probit Probit
Probability Model Coefficients Marginal Effects
Discrete-Choice -0.193∗∗∗ (0.021) -0.600∗∗∗ (0.065) -0.206∗∗∗ (0.022)
2 Cents -0.107∗∗∗ (0.016) -0.303∗∗∗ (0.047) -0.104∗∗∗ (0.016)
4 Cents -0.274∗∗∗ (0.016) -0.784∗∗∗ (0.048) -0.269∗∗∗ (0.015)
Script -0.011 (0.013) -0.033 (0.039) -0.011 (0.013)
Consequentiality 0.214∗∗∗ (0.021) 0.581∗∗∗ (0.057) 0.199∗∗∗ (0.019)
Consequentiality * Discrete-Choice 0.135∗∗∗ (0.027) 0.434∗∗∗ (0.081) 0.149∗∗∗ (0.028)
Female 0.078∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.226∗∗∗ (0.043) 0.077∗∗∗ (0.015)
Children -0.054∗∗ (0.018) -0.162∗∗ (0.053) -0.055∗∗ (0.018)
Age 0.002∗∗ (0.001) 0.006∗∗ (0.002) 0.002∗∗ (0.001)
College Degree 0.060∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.169∗∗∗ (0.044) 0.058∗∗∗ (0.015)
High income 0.007 (0.020) 0.013 (0.058) 0.005 (0.020)
Medium income -0.026 (0.021) -0.087 (0.062) -0.030 (0.021)
Low income -0.039 (0.034) -0.122 (0.098) -0.042 (0.033)
1-Person household 0.004 (0.028) 0.008 (0.083) 0.003 (0.028)
2-Person household -0.046 (0.024) -0.140∗ (0.071) -0.048∗ (0.024)
3-Person household -0.039 (0.027) -0.116 (0.078) -0.040 (0.027)
Constant 0.467∗∗∗ (0.039) -0.071 (0.113) – –
Number of Observations: 4,713 4,713 4,713
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses, ∗ denotes significance at the 5 %-level, ∗∗ at the 1 %-level,
and ∗∗∗ at the 0.1 %-level, respectively.
To address potential sample selectivity problems, we additionally estimate the
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endogenous switching regression model. Using the two-step approach described in the
methodology section, the first-stage results indicate that consequentiality is strongly
correlated with the indicator that a respondent needs more time to complete the ques-
tionnaire than the median duration (Table 7). The coefficient estimates of the second-
stage regression reconfirm the estimation results obtained from the LPM and probit
model. Specifically, from the coefficient estimate on the discrete-choice dummy in the
second-stage regression, we see again that the difference between both validation for-
mats shrinks to about 6 percentage points if we only take into account people who
perceive their answer as politically consequential. One possible reason for the similar-
ity of the results of the switching regression model and those presented in Table 6 is the
absence of sample selectivity as indicated by the statistically insignificant coefficients
on the inverse Mills ratio.
It is also of note that the results of the full information maximum likelihood esti-
mation, displayed in Table A2 of the Appendix, are very similar to those presented in
Table 7. Finally, the conjecture of no sample selectivity that is derived from the switch-
ing regression model is also supported by the estimates reported in Table A3 of the
Appendix, where the results of two separate regressions are presented: one for those
respondents who do believe that surveys influence the political decision making and
one for those who do not. In fact, the results of Table 7 and A3 are virtually identical.
6 Summary and Conclusions
Based on hypothetical responses originating from a large survey among more than
7,000 German households on their willingness-to-pay (WTP) for green electricity, this
paper has provided further evidence on the discrepancy between the outcomes of
discrete-choice and open-ended contingent valuation methods, thereby accounting for
perceived consequentiality for policy making. Theoretical work suggests that simple
survey-based assessments of consequentiality are integral to the analysis of stated-
preference data (Vossler and Watson, 2013). Recognizing that a respondent’s conse-
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Table 7: Two-Step Estimation Results for the Endogenous Switching Regression
Model
First Stage Second Stage
Consequentiality = 0 Consequentiality = 1
Discrete-Choice 0.028 (0.038) -0.194∗∗∗ (0.021) -0.058∗∗∗ (0.018)
2 Cents 0.008 (0.046) -0.089∗∗∗ (0.027) -0.117∗∗∗ (0.021)
4 Cents -0.054 (0.046) -0.234∗∗∗ (0.026) -0.300∗∗∗ (0.022)
Script 0.081∗ (0.037) -0.029 (0.023) 0.002 (0.020)
Female 0.115∗∗ (0.042) 0.109∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.061∗∗ (0.023)
Children -0.073 (0.052) -0.053 (0.030) -0.058∗ (0.025)
Age -0.000 (0.002) 0.002 (0.001) 0.002∗∗ (0.001)
College Degree 0.300∗∗∗ (0.043) 0.040 (0.046) 0.075∗ (0.038)
High income 0.065 (0.056) -0.013 (0.033) 0.019 (0.027)
Medium income -0.074 (0.059) -0.063 (0.035) -0.003 (0.029)
Low income -0.184∗ (0.093) -0.034 (0.056) -0.048 (0.050)
1-Person household 0.148 (0.081) -0.014 (0.046) 0.015 (0.042)
2-Person household 0.055 (0.068) -0.050 (0.037) -0.045 (0.033)
3-Person household 0.197∗∗ (0.075) -0.032 (0.047) -0.041 (0.043)
More time 0.162∗∗∗ (0.039) – – – –
IVM0 – – -0.017 (0.190) – –
IVM1 – – – – 0.015 (0.203)
Constant 0.029 (0.105) 0.518∗∗ (0.167) 0.645∗∗∗ (0.163)
Number of Observations: 4,713 1,812 2,901
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses, ∗ denotes significance at the 5 %-level, ∗∗ at the 1 %-level,
and ∗∗∗ at the 0.1 %-level, respectively.
quentiality status and WTP might be jointly influenced by unobservable factors, a dis-
tinguishing feature of our study is the estimation of a switching regression model that
accounts for the potential endogeneity of respondents’ belief in political consequences.
The results of this exercise, though, indicate the absence of sample selectivity.
Consistent with Czajkowski et al. (2015), Herriges et al. (2010), Hwang et al.
(2014), Nepal et al. (2009), Vossler and Watson (2013), and Vossler and Holladay (2016),
we find a positive relationship between consequentiality and WTP, a result that Vossler
and Watson (2013) call negative hypothetical bias: those respondents who perceive
there to be policy consequences exhibit a WTP that, on average, is approximately 20
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percentage points higher than those who do not. Thus, we provide for further evidence
that may reverse the common perception that stated-preference methods overestimate
non-market values.
While these findings have profound implications for the interpretation of the re-
sults of former stated-preference studies (Vossler and Watson, 2013), two other key
results emerge from our empirical analysis. First, the WTP values resulting from the
open-ended method are generally higher than those originating from the discrete-
choice format. Interestingly, this outcome was expected by most economists, but for-
mer empirical analyses, such as Halvorsen and Sœlensminde (1998), Kealy and Turner
(1993), and Seller et al. (1985), obtained the opposite result that WTP estimates orig-
inating from the discrete-choice format are substantially larger than those from the
open-ended format.
Inspired by this contrast, Carson and Groves (2007) theoretically discuss the cir-
cumstances under which either outcome can be expected. Notably, large open-ended
WTP bids may be the result of strategic considerations and an optimal strategy if an
individual’s WTP is higher than the potential costs of providing a public good, being
in perfect accord with economic theory. In our empirical example of green electricity,
large WTP bids may indicate strong preferences for its provision, not least based on
green attitudes. In fact, exaggerating WTP bids might be a straightforward strategy to
signal support for renewable energy policies (Whitehead and Cherry, 2007).
Second, our empirical results suggest that the discrepancy between both contin-
gent valuation formats is strongly reduced when focussing on those individuals who
perceive the survey as politically consequential. Such a shrinking discrepancy is also
found in a recent study by Vossler and Holladay (2016) for the comparison of single-
binary-choice and the standard open-ended format.
In the end, along the lines of the conditions that are theoretically derived by
Vossler and Holladay (2016) to ensure incentive compatibility in the open-ended for-
mat, further investigations of why the discrepancy between both elicitation formats
can be reduced appear to be a promising avenue for future research. Furthermore,
17
although our results indicate otherwise, future research on consequentiality should
also consider the potential endogeneity of respondents’ belief in the consequentiality
of their answers for policy making.
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7 Appendix
Table A1: Comparing the Means of the Explanatory Variables Across Treatment
Groups
Open-Ended Discrete-Choice Format
Format All 1 Cent 2 Cents 4 Cents
Age 55.21 55.37 55.39 55.57 55.16
Female 0.352 0.329 0.319 0.343 0.326
Children 0.704 0.703 0.704 0.714 0.690
College Degree 0.321 0.312 0.317 0.307 0.312
Script 0.500 0.500 0.499 0.500 0.500
Consequentialiy 0.591 0.608 0.620 0.625 0.579
1 Cent 0.331 0.333 1 0 0
2 Cents 0.340 0.333 0 1 0
4 Cents 0.330 0.333 0 0 1
Low income 0.083 0.082 0.080 0.088 0.078
Medium income 0.412 0.433 0.437 0.428 0.434
High income 0.334 0.313 0.304 0.303 0.331
Very high income 0.169 0.172 0.179 0.181 0.157
1-Person household 0.269 0.275 0.273 0.269 0.282
2-Person household 0.489 0.472 0.486 0.478 0.453
3-Person household 0.132 0.130 0.123 0.125 0.143
>3-Person household 0.109 0.123 0.118 0.128 0.122
More time 0.510 0.494 0.503 0.508 0.470
Number of Observations: 3,517 3,524 1,174 1,175 1,175
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Table A2: Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) Estimation Results for En-
dogenous Switching Regression Model
First Stage Second Stage
Consequentiality = 0 Consequentiality = 1
Discrete-Choice 0.028 (0.038) -0.194∗∗∗ (0.021) -0.058∗∗∗ (0.018)
2 Cents 0.008 (0.046) -0.089∗∗∗ (0.027) -0.117∗∗∗ (0.021)
4 Cents -0.053 (0.046) -0.234∗∗∗ (0.025) -0.300∗∗∗ (0.021)
Script 0.081∗ (0.037) -0.030 (0.021) 0.002 (0.018)
Female 0.115∗∗ (0.042) 0.109∗∗∗ (0.024) 0.060∗∗ (0.020)
Children -0.073 (0.052) -0.052 (0.028) -0.057∗ (0.024)
Age -0.000 (0.002) 0.002 (0.001) 0.002∗∗ (0.001)
College Degree 0.300∗∗∗ (0.043) 0.038 (0.029) 0.074∗ (0.022)
High income 0.065 (0.056) -0.014 (0.033) 0.018 (0.026)
Medium income -0.074 (0.059) -0.063 (0.033) -0.003 (0.028)
Low income -0.184∗ (0.093) -0.033 (0.052) -0.047 (0.046)
1-Person household 0.148 (0.081) -0.015 (0.042) 0.014 (0.039)
2-Person household 0.055 (0.068) -0.050 (0.036) -0.046 (0.032)
3-Person household 0.197∗∗ (0.075) -0.034 (0.042) -0.042 (0.037)
More time 0.162∗∗∗ (0.039) – – – –
IVM0 – – -0.017 (0.170) – –
IVM1 – – – – 0.014 (0.165)
Constant 0.029 (0.105) 0.511∗∗ (0.086) 0.651∗∗∗ (0.077)
Number of Observations: 4,713 1,812 2,901
Note: Standard Errors are in parentheses, ∗ denotes significance at the 5 %-level, ∗∗ at the 1 %-level,
and ∗∗∗ at the 0.1 %-level, respectively.
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Table A3: Estimation Results for the Acceptance of Future Rises in the Promotion
Cost of Green Electricity differentiated for Believing in Consequentiality
Consequentiality = 0 Consequentiality = 1
Discrete-Choice -0.194∗∗∗ (0.021) -0.058∗∗∗ (0.018)
2 Cents -0.089∗∗∗ (0.027) -0.117∗∗∗ (0.021)
4 Cents -0.234∗∗∗ (0.025) -0.300∗∗∗ (0.021)
Script -0.030 (0.020) 0.002 (0.018)
Female 0.108∗∗∗ (0.024) 0.060∗∗ (0.019)
Children -0.052 (0.028) -0.057∗ (0.024)
Age 0.002 (0.001) 0.002∗∗ (0.001)
College Degree 0.037 (0.026) 0.073∗∗∗ (0.019)
High income -0.014 (0.033) 0.018 (0.026)
Medium income -0.063 (0.033) -0.003 (0.028)
Low income -0.032 (0.051) -0.047 (0.046)
1-Person household -0.016 (0.042) 0.014 (0.038)
2-Person household -0.051 (0.036) -0.046 (0.032)
3-Person household -0.035 (0.041) -0.042 (0.035)
Constant 0.505∗∗∗ (0.059) 0.656∗∗∗ (0.048)
Number of Observations: 1,812 2,901
Note: Standard Errors are in parentheses, ∗ denotes significance at the 5 %-level,
∗∗ at the 1 %-level, and ∗∗∗ at the 0.1 %-level, respectively.
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